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Reflecting  recent  deepening of  economic  interdependence  among countries,  inter 
national  capital  and  labor  movements  have  increasingly  become as  active as  inter 
national  commodity  trade  is.  In  such  a  world with  various  ways  of  connecting eco 
nomically  the  countries  which coapose  it,  each country  will  be  required  to  choose  the 
best  regime  to  operate  its  economy  efficiently,  and  the  choice  Bade  by  one  country 
may  be  different  from  those  by  the  others  because different  countries usually have 
different  production  technologies and  factor  endowments.  This  paper  considers a 
situation  where,  expecting  the  partners  to  make  the  same  choice as  its  own,  each 
country  can unilaterally  make a  choice  between  the  regime  which allows  free  inter 
national  commodity  trade  with capital  mobility  and  the  one  which  allows  free  inter 
national  commodity  trade  with  labor  mobility  and  it  examines which  regime  is  mere 
advantageous  to  a  country  with a  particular  technology  and  factor  endowaent and 
whether  there  is  a  conflict  of  interest  between  the  countries.  With  this  question 
answered,  it  would,  in  addition,  be  possible  to  estimate  the  economic appropriateness 
of  the  existing policies  of  many  countries  to  restrict  or  prohibit  in-and-out  flows 
of  capital  and  labor. 
If  the  production  technologies  of  each good  are  identical  across  countries as 
in  the  Mundel1(1957)  model,  three  types  of  international  economic  regimes,  such as 
free  international  commodity' trade,  perfect  international  capital  mobility,  and per 
fect  international  labor  mobility,  are  completely  substitutable  for  each  other pro 
vided  that  every  country  is  incompletely  specialized.  Thus  it  is  quite  indifferent 
which  regime  is  chosen  out  of  the  three,  and hence  there  are  no  conflicts  of  interests 
between any  countries.  However,  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  if  the  technologies -2-
are  internationally  different,  introducing a  particular  type  of  technological  supe 
riority  in  one  country  but  not  the  others  is  the  situation  this  paper  intends  to  con 
sider  in  a  standard 2x2x2  trade  model. 
It  has  been pointed  out  that  at  least  one  of  the  countries  is  likely  to  special 
ize  completely  in  the  production of  its  export when  international  commoditiy  trade 
and  factor  mobility  are  simultaneously  allowed  in  the  standard  trade  model  [Jones 
(1967)].  In  fact,  Chipman(1971)  has  shown  that  if  for  given  technologies and  factor 
endowments  there  is  a  case  of  global  diversification  in  which  two  countries have 
positive  outputs  of  each good  it  occurs  at  a  unique  price  ratio  between  the  two goods. 
The  alternative  conditions  for  such a  case  to  exist  are,  according  to  Uekawa(1972), 
that  each  industry  has  a  particular  type  of  inter-country difference  in  technology  or 
each country  has  a  particular  type  of  inter-industry difference  in  technology.  Since 
the  latter  Uekawa  condition  is  sufficiently  restrictive  to  yield a  worldwide ranking 
of  industries  by  the  factor  intensity,  I  built  the  model  based  on  it  to  shed  light  on 
the  problem of  choice between  the  two  international  econoaic  regimes  froa  the welfare 
point  of  view  of  the  countries with diversified  production structures.  It  can also  be 
shown  that  the  model  based  on  the  other  Uekawa  condition  together  with an alternative 
assumption of  the  factor-intensity  ranking  leads  to  the  results which are  essentially 
the  same  but  superficially different  from  the  ones  derived  here. 
There  is  little  literature  on  the  choice  between  international  capital  and  labor 
mobility.  Wong(1983)  deals  with  the  choice problem  in  the  standard  trade  model  from 
the  welfare  viewpoint  of  a  small  country  which has  the  same  factor  endoweent  ratio as 
the  partner's but  a  type  of  inter-country  difference  in  technology  such  that  it  forces 
the  small  country  into  complete  specialization under  regimes  allowing both  free  inter 
national  trade  and  factor  mobility.  These  special  characteristics  of  his  model  narrow -3-
the  applicability  of  his  results  to  the  real  world and  make  it  impossible  for  hia  to 
reveal  relations  between  the  choice  of  a  regime  and  the  factor  endowment  and  to  show 
the  possibility  of  international  conflicts  of  interests.  Ranaswani(1968),  Bhagwati-
Srinivasan(1983),  Calvo-Wellisz(1983),  and  Jones-Coelho-Easton(1906)  argue  the 
problen of  which  is  an optimal  policy  for  a  capital-abundant  country with monopoly and 
monopsony  powers  in  world  factor  markets between  the  policies  restricting capital 
outflows and  labor  inflows  to  respective  optioal  levels  in  two-factor,  one-sector 
models  with  internationally  identical  technologies.  They are different  fron the 
present  paper  in  that  they  look at  the  choice  problen  only  froa  one  country's point 
of  view and  they  neglect  the  involvement  of  coaaodity  trade  and  international  differ 
ences  in  technology. -30-
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